This paper studies the time complexity of reading unauthenticated data from a distributed storage made of a set of failure-prone base objects. More specifically, we consider the abstraction of a robust read/write storage that provides wait-free access to unauthenticated data over a set of base storage objects with t possible failures, out of which at most b are arbitrary and the rest are simple crash failures.
INTRODUCTION
We study robust storage implementations that provide wait-free [11] access to unauthenticated data in an asynchronous environment over a set of S base storage objects: t of these might fail, out of which b (b > 0) might be arbitrary [12] (also called Byzantine [14] ) failures. The storage we consider implements the celebrated single-writer multireader (SWMR) register abstraction in a hostile environment [13] .
Motivated by the availability of networks of commodity disks, such implementations have been widely studied in the last decade. Whereas original storage implementations tolerated only crash failures of the base objects (i.e., the case where b = 0) [3] , more recent implementations tolerated arbitrary object failures (b = 0) [1, 4-9, 12, 18] . The optimal resilience for such implementations was shown to be S = 2t + b + 1, assuming b = t [18] , but can easily be extended to the general b = t case.
Maybe surprisingly given the large body of literature in the area, there is no general result on the time complexity of reading in such a storage. This is particularly surprising since the read operation is considered the most frequent in practice. Typically, we would like to determine the latency of the read operation, which can be measured as the number of communication round-trips (or simply rounds) needed in the worst case between the reader and the base objects, before a value can be returned.
The complexity of writing has actually been carefully studied. The tight lower bound on the worst-case complexity of the write operation was shown to be 2 rounds when at most 2t + 2b of these objects are used; if more than 2t + 2b base objects are available, then a single round suffices [1] 1 . This lower bound is general, since it was established for any safe storage; a storage that simply ensures that a read returns the last written value if it is not concurrent with any write [13] . In fact, it was also shown in [1] that this bound is tight, even for a stronger regular storage: one that is not only safe but also only returns written values, even if there is a concurrent writer [13] .
There is no such general picture for a read operation. In fact, the complexity of reading was studied, but only in some specific cases. For instance, it was shown that, for any safe storage, when readers do not modify the state of the base objects, the optimal read complexity with less than 2t + 2b base objects is b + 1 rounds [1] . It was also shown that the optimal complexity of an atomic read, providing the illusion of instantaneous access [13] , is one round when (a) more than R(t + b) + 2t + b base objects are available (where R is the number of readers) and if the write also takes one round [7] , or (b) the read does not encounter any contention, asynchrony or many failures [8, 9] .
But what is the general complexity of a read operation? The contribution of this paper is to address this fundamental question for the worst case, and in particular for an optimally resilient storage.
• We prove a 2-round lower bound for reading from a safe storage that uses at most 2t + 2b base objects, independently of the number or rounds needed by the writer.
• We then prove the lower bound tight even for a regular storage that is optimally resilient and uses 2t + b + 1 base objects.
We address this question first by considering a data centric storage [17] in which the base objects represent (active) disks (i.e., atomic read-modify-write objects) that do not communicate among each other, nor initiate unsolicited messages to the clients (i.e., push messages). Later in the paper, we show how to migrate our lower bound to a server centric model where the data is stored within first class processes that can send unsolicited messages (Section 6). The model we describe in Section 2 allows us to easily extend our data centric model into a server centric one.
We proceed through three major steps.
1. We first prove in Section 3 that S = 2t + 2b base objects are insufficient for a safe SWSR wait-free storage implementation in which every read takes one roundtrip (we say it is fast). Roughly, our proof derives a contradiction from three runs that are indistinguishable to the reader. In the first run, a read is concurrent with the write and all base objects are correct; in the second one, the write precedes the read but malicious base objects forge their state to simulate the concurrency of the first run; finally, in the third run, malicious base objects forge their state to simulate the above mentioned concurrency, although the write is never invoked. As the read must return the same value in all three runs, without invoking additional communication round-trips, safety is violated in either the second, or the third run. In our proof, we do not make any assumption on the time-complexity of the write operation. We assume however that data is not authenticated [20] ; data authentication is considered a source of overhead [15, 19] , and we would typically like to avoid using authentication when seeking optimal time-complexity. If we permit data authentication, then regular storage can be implemented fairly simply, while achieving both optimal resilience and fast reads/writes [16] .
2. We then describe in Section 4 an optimally resilient SWMR safe storage algorithm that features optimal (worst-case) time complexity for both read and write operations: 2 rounds. This algorithm is interesting in its own right as it contradicts the conjecture of [1] suggesting that b + 1 rounds are needed in order to read from a safe storage. The algorithm uses novel techniques to combine optimal resilience with optimal time-complexity. Roughly, unlike in traditional safe storages we know of, in both of their communication rounds, readers both change the state of the base objects and read their current state. The writer does the same in its first round, along with simply writing in the second round. Basically, by allowing readers to change the state of the base objects, twice in a row, we allow the readers to carefully filter the responses from malicious base objects that may be trying to mislead the reader.
3. Finally, we show in Section 5 how to modify our safe implementation and obtain a regular one without sacrificing neither optimal resilience nor optimal timecomplexity. Our regular implementation relies however on the fact that base objects keep all the values they receive from the writer (which is not the case with our safe implementation). Although some very practical storage systems rely on the same assumption [8] , this might raise issues of storage exhaustion and needs careful garbage collection. Comparable data-centric regular wait-free storage implementations that do not rely on this assumption are either not optimally resilient [2] , or do not feature the optimal (worst-case) time-complexity of the read operation [9] .
For the lack of space, correctness proofs of our algorithms are given in the full version of the paper [10] .
MODEL
The distributed system we consider consists of three disjoint sets of processes: a set objects of size S containing processes {s1, ..., sS} and representing the base storage elements; a singleton writer containing a single process {w}; and a set readers of size R containing processes {r1, ..., rR}. The set clients is the union of the sets writer and readers. We assume that every client may communicate with any process by message passing using point-to-point reliable communication channels. However, objects cannot communicate among each other, nor send messages to clients other than in reply to clients' messages. (We will come back to this assumption later in the paper in Section 6.)
For presentation simplicity, we also assume a global clock, which, however, is not accessible to either clients or objects, for these have an asynchronous perception of their environment.
Runs and Algorithms
The state of the communication channel between processes p and q is viewed as a set msetp,q = msetq,p containing messages that are sent but not yet received. We assume that every message has two tags which identify the sender and the receiver of the message. A distributed algorithm A is a collection of deterministic automata, where Ap is the automata assigned to process p. Computation of non-malicious processes proceeds in steps of A. A step of A is denoted by a pair of process id and message set < p, M > (M might be ∅). In step sp =< p, M >, process p atomically does the following (we say that p takes step sp): (1) removes the messages in M from msetp, * , (2) applies M and its current state stp to Ap, which outputs a new state st p and a set of messages to be sent, and then (3) p adopts st p as its new state and puts the output messages in msetp, * . Moreover, a non-malicious object si may put the output messages in msets i ,c in step sp =< p, M > only if si received in sp a message m ∈ M sent by the client c (we relax this restriction in Section 6, when discussing the server centric model). A malicious process p can perform arbitrary actions: (1) it can remove/put arbitrary messages from/into msetp, * and (2) it can change its state in an arbitrary manner.
Given any algorithm A, a run of A is an infinite sequence of steps of A taken by non-malicious processes, and actions of malicious processes, such that the following properties hold for each non-malicious process p: (1) initially, for each non-malicious process q, msetp,q = ∅, (2) the current state in the first step of p is a special state Init, (3) for each step < p, M > of A, and for every message m ∈ M , p is the receiver of m and ∃q, msetp,q that contains m immediately before the step < p, M > is taken, and (4) if there is a step that puts a message m in msetp, * such that p is the receiver of m and p takes an infinite number of steps, then there is a subsequent step < p, M > such that m ∈ M . A partial run is a finite prefix of some run. A (partial) run r extends some partial run pr if pr is a prefix of r. At the end of a partial run, all messages that are sent but not yet received are said to be in transit.
We say that a non-malicious process p is correct in a run r if p takes an infinite number of steps of A in r. Otherwise a non-malicious process p is crash-faulty. We say that a crashfaulty process p crashes at step sp in a run, if sp is the last step of p in that run. Malicious and crash-faulty processes are called faulty. In any run of our model, at most t objects might be faulty. At most b out of these t objects may be malicious. In this paper we assume b > 0. An algorithm that assumes a total number of objects S equal to 2t + b + 1 is said to be optimally resilient.
For presentation simplicity, we do not explicitly model the initial state of a process, nor the invocations and responses of the operations of the atomic storage to be implemented. We assume that the algorithm A initializes the processes, and schedules invocation/response of operations (i.e., A modifies the states of the processes accordingly). However, we say that p invokes op at step sp, if A modifies the state of a process p in step sp so as to invoke an operation (and similarly for a response).
Robust Storage
A storage abstraction is a READ/WRITE data structure. It provides two operations: WRITE(v), which stores v in the storage, and READ(), which returns the value from the storage. We assume that each client invokes at most one operation at a time (i.e., does not invoke the next operation until it receives the response for the current operation). Only readers invoke READ operations and only the writer invokes WRITE operations. We further assume that the initial value of a storage is a special value ⊥, which is not a valid input value for a WRITE operation. We say that an operation op is complete in a (partial) run if the run contains a response step for op. In any run, we say that a complete operation op1 precedes operation op2 (or op2 succeeds op1) if the response step of op1 precedes the invocation step of op2 in that run. If neither op1 nor op2 precedes the other, the operations are said to be concurrent.
An algorithm implements a robust safe (resp., regular ) storage if every run of the algorithm satisfies wait-freedom and safety (resp., regularity) properties. Wait-freedom states that if a client invokes an operation and does not crash, eventually the client receives a response (i.e., operation completes), independently of the possible crashes of any other client. Here we give a definition of safety and regularity for the SWMR storage.
In the single-writer setting, the WRITE operations in a run have a natural ordering which corresponds to their physical order. Denote by wr k the k th WRITE in a run (k ≥ 1), and by val k the value written by wr k . Let val0 = ⊥.
We say that a partial run satisfies safety if every READ operation rd that is not concurrent with any WRITE operation returns val k such that wr k precedes rd and for no l > k wr l precedes rd, or val0 in case there is no such a value; a READ concurrent with a WRITE is allowed to return any value.
Similarly, we say that a partial run satisfies regularity if the following properties hold: (1) if a READ returns x then there is k such that val k = x, (2) if a READ rd is complete and it succeeds some WRITE wr k (k ≥ 1), then rd returns val l such that l ≥ k, and (3) if a READ rd returns val k (k ≥ 1), then wr k either precedes rd or is concurrent with rd.
In the following, under the notion of implementation, we assume, by default, a wait-free storage that stores unauthenticated data in an asynchronous communication model.
Fast READ
Basically, we say that a READ operation is fast if it completes in a single communication round-trip. In every communication round-trip (we simply say round) rnd of an operation op invoked by the client c:
1. The client c sends messages to all objects. This is indeed without loss of generality because we can simply model the fact that messages are not sent to certain objects by having these objects not change their state or reply.
2. Objects, on receiving such a message, reply to the reader (resp., writer) before receiving any other messages (as dictated by our model).
3. When the invoking client receives a sufficient number of such replies, the round (rnd) terminates.
Note that, since any number of clients can crash, we can construct partial runs in which no client receives any message from any other client. In our proof in Section 3 we focus, without loss of generality, on such partial runs. Moreover, since up to t objects might crash in our model, ideally, in every round rnd the invoking client can only wait for reply messages from S − t correct objects.
A READ rd is fast if rd completes in the step in which the first round of rd terminates. We say that a storage implementation I is a fast READ implementation, if every complete READ operation in every run of I is fast. For a fast READ implementation, we can say without ambiguity that the messages sent by a reader, on invoking a READ, are of type read, and the messages sent by a process to the reader, on receiving a read message, of type readack.
LOWER BOUND
We prove in this section that there is no safe storage implementation with at most 2t + 2b objects in which every READ is fast. In our proof, we assume that a set of readers is a singleton.
Proposition 1.
There is no fast READ implementation I of a single reader (SWSR) safe storage that makes use of less than 2t + 2b + 1 objects.
Preliminaries. Recall first that w denotes the writer, r1 the reader, and si for 1 ≤ i ≤ S denote the objects. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is a safe storage implementation I that uses at most 2t + 2b objects, such that, in every (partial) run of I every READ operation completes in a single round (i.e., every READ is fast).
We partition the set of objects into four distinct subsets (which we call blocks), denoted by T1 and T2, each of size exactly t, and B1 and B2 of size at least 1 and at most b. Note that we assume S ≥ 2t + 2, without loss of generality since the number of objects for any implementation I must conform with the optimal resilience lower bound of S ≥ 2t + b + 1 [18] (recall that we assume b > 0). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that each of the blocks T1, T2, B1 and B2 contains at least one object. We refer to the initial state of every correct object as σ0.
We say that a message m of a round rnd of an incomplete operation op skips a set of blocks BS in a partial run (where BS ⊆ {T1, T2, B1, B2}), if (1) no object in any block BL ∈ BS receives m in round rnd of op in that partial run, (2) all other objects receive m in round rnd of op and reply to that message, and (3) all these reply messages are in transit. We say that a complete operation op skips a set of blocks BS in a partial run, if (1) no object in any block BL ∈ BS receives any message in any round of op in that partial run, (2) all objects that are not in any block BL ∈ BS receive the message from the invoking client in every round of op and reply to such message, and (3) the invoking client receives all these reply messages and, finally, returns from the invocation.
Block diagrams. We illustrate the idea behind the proof in Figure 1 . We depict a round rnd of an operation op through a set of rectangles, arranged in a single column. In the column corresponding to some round rnd of an operation op, we draw a rectangle in the particular row, if all objects in the corresponding block BL have received the message from the client in round rnd of op and have sent reply messages, i.e., we draw a rectangle in the row corresponding to BL if round rnd of op does not skip BL.
Proof. To exhibit a contradiction, we construct a partial run of the safe implementation I that violates safety. More specifically, we exhibit a partial run in which some READ returns a value that was never written.
• Let run1 be the partial run in which all objects are correct except T1 that crashes at the beginning of run1. Furthermore, let rd1 be the READ operation by the reader (r1) and no other operation is invoked in run1.
In run1, r1 crashes and rd1 skips B2, T1 and T2. After B1 sends readack to r1, run1 ends. We refer to the state of object B1, at the end of run1 as to σ1. 
invoked by the correct writer to write a value v1 = ⊥ in the storage. By our assumption on I (I is wait-free), wr1 completes in run2, say at time t1 after invoking a finite number (k) of rounds. Therefore, wr1 skips T1, and completes (at latest) after the writer receives the replies in round k from correct objects (B1, B2, and T2). We refer to the state of the correct object B2 at time t1 as to σ2.
• Let run 2 be the partial run that ends at t1, such that run 2 is identical to run2 up to time t1, except that in run 2 object T1 does not crash, but, due to asynchrony, all messages sent by the writer to T1 during wr1 remain in transit. Since the writer cannot distinguish run2 from run 2 , wr1 skips T1 and completes in run 2 at t1.
• Let run 2 be the partial run identical to run 2 up to time t1, except that, in run 2 , (1) the reader does not crash in run 2 , but, due to asynchrony, all messages that were in transit in run 2 are delayed in run 2 until after t1, and (2) object T2 crashes at t1. By our assumption on the wait-freedom of I, rd1 completes in run 2 at t2 after receiving readack messages from correct objects (B1, B2 and T1) and returns some value vR, skipping T2.
• Let run3 be the partial run identical to run 2 , except that, in run3, T2 does not crash, but, due to asynchrony, all messages exchanged between r1 and T2 during rd1 are delayed until after t2. Since r1 cannot distinguish run3 from run 2 , rd1 completes in run3 at t2 and returns vR. Note that in run3 all objects are correct.
• Let run4 be the partial run similar to run3, except that, in run4: (1) rd1 is invoked only after wr1 completes (after t1) (2) B1 is malicious and forges it state to σ1 at the beginning of the run (as if it received a round 1 message of rd1 from the reader, as in run3), before wr1 is invoked, (3) after t1, a READ rd1 is invoked and (4) at t1, B1, before replying to rd1, forges its state to σ0, the initial state of correct objects.
Other messages are delivered as in run3, in particular, messages exchanged between r1 and T1 are transit in run4. Note that wr1 cannot distinguish run4 from run3 and hence, wr1 completes in run4 at t1. Note also that, rd1 is invoked after wr1 completes, so safety implies that rd1 must return v1. However, note that in run3 and run4 the reader receives in rd1 the identical messages and, since the processes do not have access to global clock, r1 (as well as the correct objects B2, T1 and T2) cannot distinguish run4 from run3. Therefore, in run3 and run4 rd1 returns the same value, i.e., vR, that, by safety, must equal v1.
• Finally, consider the partial run run5 in which wr1 is never invoked, but B2 is malicious and forges its state to σ2 at the beginning of the run. READ rd1 is invoked in run5 as in run4. Since, upon receiving readack messages from B1, B2 and T1, the reader receives identical information as in run4, the reader cannot distinguish run4 from run5 (neither can correct objects B1, T1 and T2), and rd1 completes in run5 and returns a vR = v1.
However, by safety, in run5, rd1 must return ⊥. Since v1 = ⊥, safety is violated in run5.
SAFE IMPLEMENTATION
Our algorithm uses S = 2t + b + 1 objects (optimal resilience) to implement a SWMR safe storage. Besides its optimal resilience, our implementation features optimal (worstcase) time complexity for both READ and WRITE operations, i.e., two communication round-trips. In fact, the existence of our algorithm proves the following proposition: Proposition 2. There is an optimally resilient implementation I of a SWMR safe storage such that, in every partial run of I, every (READ/WRITE) operation completes in at most two communication round-trips.
In the following, we give a detailed description of our algorithm. Due to lack of space, we omit the correctness proof (see the full paper [10] ).
Overview
Both the READ and the WRITE operations take at most two rounds. In each round, the client (reader or writer) sends a message to all objects. A round terminates at the latest when the client receives the responses from S − t correct objects. In the first round, the writer, in addition to writing data, reads control data from the objects. Readers write control data and read data written by the writer in both rounds.
The base objects maintain the following variables (we call fields) pw, w and the array tsr [1, .. 
., R]
(where R is the number of readers). In the pw field, objects store a timestampvalue pair tsval of the form ts, v . In the w field, objects store the following pair: tsval, tsrarray [1. .S] . Fields pw and w are written by the writer, and each field tsr[j] by the reader rj.
In both rounds of the READ, the reader rj: (1) increases its local timestamp tsr j and stores it in the objects' tsr [j] field and (2) reads the objects' fields pw and w.
In the first round of the WRITE (called P W ), the writer, writing the value v: (1) increases its timestamp ts, (2) assigns the timestamp-value pair ts, v to its variable pw , (3) writes pw to the objects' pw fields and the last copy of w to the objects' w fields, (4) reads the values of objects' fields tsr[ * ] that are written by readers and (5) adds the values tsr[ * ] to the array (of arrays) currenttsrarray. Upon receiving S − t responses from different objects in round P W , the writer proceeds to the second round, W .
In the second round of the WRITE, the writer: (1) assigns w := pw , currenttsrarray and (2) writes pw to the objects' pw fields and w to the objects' w fields. Upon receiving S − t responses from different objects in round W , the WRITE completes. The objects change the values of tsr[ * ], pw, and w only if these are newer than the copies already stored (Figure 3) .
The WRITE implementation is given in Figure 2 . In the following, we detail the READ implementation, since it is slightly more involved and the main focus of this paper.
READ implementation
The full READ implementation is given in Figure 4 . In the following, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we refer to if ts > ts then 5: ts := ts ; pw := pw ; w := w 6:
send As we previously mentioned, in both rounds of the READ, the reader: (1) increases its local timestamp tsr j (lines 9 and 12), and stores it in the objects' tsr[j] fields using READ1 (in the first round), or READ2 (in the second round) messages (lines 10 and 13) and (2) reads the objects' fields pw and w by receiving READ1 ACK * , or READ2 ACK * messages (lines 11, 14 and 21-26).
When the reader receives a timestamp-value pair pw from the pw field of object si (we say si reports pw ), the reader adds i, the index of object si, to the set RP W (pw ) that is initially empty. Similarly, if si reports a tuple w in its w field, the reader adds i to the set RW (w ). If this occurs in the first round of the READ, the reader also adds i to F irstRW (w ). (lines 22, 23 and 26) Every tuple c reported by some object in its w field in the first round of the READ, is added by the reader to the set of candidate values, the set C (line 24). A candidate value c is automatically removed from C if at least t + b + 1 objects respond (in any round of the READ) without c in their w field (lines 2 and 27-28).
In the first round, the reader rj awaits responses from a set that contains at least S −t = t+b+1 objects such that there is no conflict between any 2 objects si and s k that belong to this set (set Resp1OK, line 11). A conflict between two objects arises when one object, say s k , reports in its w field a candidate value c, such that c.tsrarray [i] [j] > tsrF R (line 4), where tsrF R is the timestamp of the reader rj in the first round of READ (line 9). In other words, object s k claims that the object si reported to the writer a timestamp of the reader rj higher than any timestamp that rj has issued so far. Intuitively, in this case, at least one of the objects s k or si is malicious. Hence, in a set that contains only correct objects there is no conflict between any two objects. As there are at least S − t correct objects, hence the intuition on why the first round of READ eventually completes (i.e., why the condition in line 11 eventually holds).
At the beginning of the second round of the READ, the reader rj increments its local timestamp tsr j once more (line 12) and sends a READ2 tsr j to all objects (line 13). Then the reader waits for the responses from objects until there is a candidate value c with the highest timestamp in C (i.e., highCand(c) holds, line 4), such that saf e(c) holds or until C is empty (this can occur only if the READ is concurrent with some WRITE). The predicate saf e(c) holds if at least b + 1 different objects have responded either in their w (or pw) fields with c (or c.tsval for pw), or with a value with a higher timestamp (line 3).
Our implementation guarantees that the condition in line 14 is eventually satisfied in every READ. In the following, we give a rough intuition on why this is true (the detailed proof of correctness can be found in the full paper [10] ).
Assume, by contradiction, that there is a READ rd by some reader rj (in run r) such that rd never completes, i.e., there is a candidate value c in rd, such that c is never eliminated from C and c is never safe. Consider the following three cases.
• Candidate value c was reported by at least one correct object in the first round of the READ rd. In this case, at least b + 1 correct objects have already set their pw fields to c.tsval before the second round of rd is invoked and these objects reply in the second round with c.tsval or a later value in their pw fields and, hence, saf e(c) eventually holds. • Consider now the second case, in which no correct object ever reports c in its w field to rj. Eventually all correct objects, at least S − t = t + b + 1 of them respond with some value different from c in their w fields and c is excluded from C (lines 27-28).
• Finally, consider the third case, in which (1) no correct object reports c in its w field in the first round of the READ rd and (2) at least one correct object reports c in its w field in the second round of rd. In this case, some malicious objects have forged c, but c was indeed later written concurrently with the READ rd. Note that the value of the array of arrays of reader timestamps reported to the writer, c.tsrarray, is crucial in this case. It contains values of tsr[j] fields of at least S − t − t = b + 1 correct objects that those objects reported to the writer during the WRITE wr (concurrent with rd) that actually wrote c. Denote by tsrF R the timestamp of the reader rj in the first round of rd. Note that a correct object si sets tsr[j] to a value higher than tsrF R (i.e., tsrF R + 1, since by our assumption, rd never completes and, therefore, rj never sets its timestamp to a value higher than tsrF R + 1) only upon si receives a second round message of rd.
For every such a correct object si, if c.tsrarray[i][j]
≤ tsrF R, the object si will respond to the second round of rd with c.tsval in its pw field or with a later value (otherwise c.
tsrarray[i][j] > tsrF R in the P W round of wr). On the other hand, if c.tsrarray[i][j] > tsrF R
at the end of the first round of rd, every (malicious) object that reported c in its w field in the first round of the READ will be in conflict with si. Therefore, In other words, in any run r of our algorithm, for any c ∈ C, saf e(c) eventually holds in r, or c is eventually removed from C (in r).
REGULAR IMPLEMENTATION
Our tight lower bound on the time-complexity of READ operations extends to stronger storage semantics: optimally resilient regular storage. In this section, we show how to transform our safe implementation (Section 4) to provide regular semantics while retaining optimal resilience and optimal time-complexity of READ and WRITE operations (i.e., rounds). (For the lack of space, the proof of correctness of the transformation is given in the full paper [10] .)
The main difference between our regular implementation and our safe implementation, is that objects keep track of all values they receive from the writer throughout the entire run (for simplicity we say that objects store the entire history). For presentation simplicity, we will assume in the following that in every READ round, objects send all the values received from the writer (i.e., the entire history) to the reader. However, later, at the end of this section, we show how to simply optimize our implementation in order to drastically decrease the size of messages exchanged between objects and readers in our algorithm (as well as memory requirements and computational complexity at readers).
The communication pattern of our regular implementation is the same as that of our safe implementation of Section 4. Moreover, the principle of choosing the value to return in the reader code is essentially the same, only the set of candidate values to choose from becomes larger than in our safe implementation.
The WRITE implementation remains unchanged, i.e., we can reuse the implementation given in Figure 2 , Section 4.
However, object si, on reception of P W ts , pw , w from the writer, with ts > ts, where ts is the timestamp of the latest P W or W message received by si from the writer, updates ts and assigns historyi Moreover, on reception of the READk message from the reader with a timestamp tsr , the object si replies with the message READk ACKi tsr , historyi , where k denotes the round (k ∈ {1, 2}). (We later show how the size of READk ACK * messages can be drastically decreased). The entire modified object code is given in Figure 5 .
We give the modified reader code in Figure 6 . Fig. 6 ) Similarly to our safe implementation, in the first round of rd, the reader rj awaits responses from a set that contains at least S − t objects such that there is no conflict between any 2 objects si and s k that belong to this set (line 11, Fig. 6 ). A conflict between two objects arises when Fig.6 ). In other words, c if safe if at least b + 1 objects confirm that the timestamp-value pair c.tsval has been written by the writer in a write with a timestamp c.tsval.ts.
• invalid(c Fig.6 ). In other words, c if invalid if at least t + b +1 objects did not receive c with a timestamp c.tsval.ts from the writer.
As soon as the predicate invalid(c) holds, c is removed from the set C (lines 26 and 27, Fig. 6 ).
The reader receives READ2 ACKi messages (in the second round of READ) until there is a candidate value c such that saf e(c) holds and there is no other candidate value with a higher timestamp. This is guaranteed to occur at latest after the reader receives the responses from all correct objects in the second round of READ. Roughly, the principle behind this fact, is the same as in our safe implementation.
It is relatively easy to see how we can simply modify our regular implementation such that objects do not send their entire histories to readers within the READk ACKi messages. Consider READ rd by rj. It is sufficient that the reader rj stores (caches) the value cachej .val it returned in its last READ that preceded rd along with the timestamp associated with cachej .val, cachej .ts. Then, in the first round of rd, rj includes cachej .ts in its READ1 message, and the object si send in READk ACKi messages in rd only the portion of the historyi from historyi[cachej .ts] onwards. It may occur in this case that, after two rounds of READ, the set C is empty. In this case, rj simply returns cachej .val. The rest of the algorithm can be reused as such.
SERVER-CENTRIC MODEL
We extend our model of Section 2 to a server-centric model, by assuming point-to-point channels among objects (servers) and removing the restriction that objects can send messages only in response to clients. In other words, in the servercentric model, base objects are first class processes (servers) that can exchange messages with other servers and even send unsolicited messages to clients (i.e., push messages). As a consequence, the range of communication patterns is very broad and not bound by the pattern of a communication round-trip. Clearly, the notion of a communication roundtrip needs to be revisited as a complexity metric.
For example, clients in a server-centric model may send only one message to (a subset of) servers and wait for the reception of pushed messages, until they receive sufficient amount of information for returning a value. It is not difficult to see that, in an asynchronous system, clients need only to send this first message to a subset of servers in order to return a meaningful value.
The notion of a single communication round-trip (round) and fast READ operations (that complete in a single round) is however meaningful even in the server centric model [7] . Intuitively, a fastest possible operation in this model is similar to that of our data-centric model; i.e., a fast operation op in which: (a) the client c sends messages to (a subset of) servers, (b) servers, on receiving such a message, reply to c, without waiting for the reception of any other message from any other server or client and (c) upon c receiving a sufficient number of these replies (at latest upon c receives replies from S − t correct servers) op completes.
It is not difficult to see, along with our lower bound proof of Section 3, that our lower bound (Proposition 1 of Section 3) holds in the server-centric model as well (with the fast READ operations defined as above). In other words, even in the server-centric model, if at most 2t + 2b servers are used, then it is impossible to construct a SWSR safe regular storage in which every READ is fast. Devising a tight bound algorithm, however, might require a different metric; this is however out of the scope of this paper.
